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SCRIPPS OR ATLANTIC: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
SQUARES OFF OVER THE SCOPE OF
PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS PATENTS
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("CAFC" or "Federal Circuit") to bring greater
stability to patent law by granting a single court exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.' In general, the court
has succeeded in standardizing patent law.2 Product-by-pro-
1 Congress established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC" or
"Federal Circuit") in the Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (relevant provisions codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") and the
Court of Claims were the precursors to the CAFC. The Federal Circuit adopted
CCPA and Court of Claims decisions as binding precedent in South Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
The Federal Circuit's patent jurisdiction consists primarily of hearing appeals
from United States district courts and from the Patent and Trademark Office's
("PTO") Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (a)(4)(A)
(1988). In addition, the Federal Circuit hears appeals from the United States
Court of Claims (§ 1295(a)(3)); appeals from the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade (§ 1295(a)(5)); and final determinations relating to unfair trade prac-
tices in import trade from the United States International Trade Commission (§
1295(a)(6)). The highest percentage of CAFC cases relate to patents.
A patent is a right to exclude others from making, using or selling the
claimed product or process in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The right
is conferred on an individual who has met the requirements of the patent statutes
set out under Title 35 of the United States Code. One court has described a pat-
ent as a
written contract between an inventor and the government .... The con-
sideration given on the part of the inventor to the government is the
disclosure of his invention .... The consideration on the part of the
government given to the patentee for such disclosure is a monopoly for
seventeen years of the invention disclosed to the extent of the claims
allowed in the patent.
Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94, 99 (D. Mass. 1989).
' Prior to the establishment of the CAFC, attorneys characterized circuits as
"pro-patent" or "anti-patent." See H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1981). A patentholder therefore would bring a case against alleged patent infring-
ers before a "pro-patent" circuit, as it was more likely to uphold the patent and
find the defendant guilty of infringement. Likewise, an alleged infringer would
attempt to defend the case in an "anti-patent" circuit because the court was likely
1693
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
cess law, however, is in considerable confusion as a result of
the CAFC's recent decision in Atlantic Thernoplastics Co. v.
Faytex Corp.
3
to invalidate the patent and find no infringement. The creation of the CAFC pri-
marily was aimed at remedying this type of forum shopping. See S. REP. 97-275,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CA.N. 11, 15; see also
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacat-
ed on jurisdictional grounds and remanded, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). See generally
Robert Desmond, Nothing Seems "Obvious" to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit: The Federal Circuit, Unchecked by the Supreme Court, Transforms the
Standard of Obviousness Under the Patent Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 455, 457-64
(1993) (historical look at the debate leading to the creation of the CAFC and the
concerns regarding the formation of a specialized court that lacks Supreme Court
oversight); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (review of the first five years of CAFC's exis-
tence and its effect on patent law).
One commentator, while referring to the goal of achieving uniformity within
patent law, observed that "as the only appellate court dealing with the substantive
law of patents, [the CAFC] could hardly fail." ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT at ix (2d ed. 1991). The CAFC essentially is the final arbi-
ter for patent disputes, as the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in patent
cases. Indeed, the Supreme Court has heard only four substantive patent law
cases since the creation of the CAFC in 1982: Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech-
nical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.
661 (1990); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989);
and Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
The danger associated with an exclusive jurisdiction is that absent any appre-
ciable appellate oversight the court may decide issues too hastily. Nearly two
years after the creation of the circuit, Senior Circuit Judge Nichols warned:
I think we are painting ourselves into corners by our eagerness to pro-
nounce legal doctrines not immediately necessary to make our decisions,
and the more important our words are, the more confining will be the
corners into which we have painted ourselves. I further think that our
exclusive jurisdiction, over certain areas of law, is not to be construed as
a legislative direction to ignore the efforts of other courts to deal with
the same problems, efforts exerted when over many years they shared
the responsibility that is now ours.
Weinar v. Rollform, Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
3 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992). One month after the initial opinion, Chief
Judge Nies moved sua sponte to rehear Atlantic en banc. In two votes by the full
circuit panel the rehearing en banc was denied; the first vote by a 7 to 3 margin,
the second vote, 6 to 4. Following this opinion, those judges who voted to rehear
the case en ban, Chief Judge Nies and Circuit Judges Rich, Newman and Lourie,
wrote dissenting opinions to the denial of rehearing, which are collected at Atlan-
tic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In addi-
tion, Circuit Judge Rader wrote a concurrence to the denial of the rehearing en
ban in Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
1992). The initial opinion and the concurring and dissenting opinions will be re-
ferred to collectively as Atlantic.
The Federal Circuit's most senior judge, Judge Rich, censured the Atlantic
panel, citing its most egregious act as "its defiant disregard, for the first time in
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In Atlantic, a Federal Circuit panel implicitly overruled a
prior panels decision in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation
v. Genentech, Inc.4 The Atlantic and Scripps decisions disagree
on the extent of the monopoly granted to an inventor who uses
a product-by-process claim to obtain a patent. A product-by-
process claim allows an inventor to patent a product by de-
scribing the process used to manufacture it. 5 This method is of
particular importance in fields like biotechnology where often
the knowledge does not exist to describe adequately a product's
structure or characteristics with the level of detail required to
obtain a conventional product patent.
Scripps offers a typical example of this dilemma. In
Scripps, a pharmaceutical company that had patented a blood-
clotting agent using a product-by-process claim subsequently
brought an infringement suit against a defendant who used a
different process to produce a purer version of the blood-clot-
ting agent. A Federal Circuit panel held that the product-by-
process claim should be treated as a product claim for the
this court's nearly ten-year history, of its rule that no precedent can be disregard-
ed or overruled save by an in bane court." Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1281 (Rich, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Rich found the panel's
explanation of its decision "not only insulting to the Scripps panelLI . . . [but]
mutiny. It is heresy. It is illegal." Id.
Interestingly, the 6 to 4 split in the court reflects the judges' backgrounds.
The majority group of judges has a largely non-technical background, while the
minority group has had extensive technical experience. Three of the four judges in
the minority group-Chief Judge Nies and Judges Newman and Rich-have exten-
sive training in patent law. Two of these judges had earlier careers as research
chemists. Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1281 (Rich, J., dissenting). Among the minority,
two have served as directors of Patent Divisions of large corporations, two were
partners with intellectual property law firms and one taught patent law at Colum-
bia Law School. All have served in key positions with multiple intellectual proper-
ty organizations.
On average, the minority group also has had more experience on the bench
than the majority group. The four judges in the minority averaged 15 years on
the CAFC or CCPA, while the judges in the majority group averaged four years
on the CAFC and, in one case, the Court of Claims. Search of WESTLAW, WLD-
Judge database (Oct. 1994).
4 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). As Circuit Judge Newman stated: "[Tjhese
overtly conflicting decisions will repose in the official reporters, I suppose some
day to be resolved, but meanwhile to place this law in disarray." Atlantic, 974
F.2d at 1282 (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
See 2 DoNALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 8.05 (1994). For a discussion of the




purpose of infringement.6 Thus, if the products in question
were sufficiently alike, there would be infringement.!
Little more than a year later, a different panel of Federal
Circuit judges faced a similar problem in Atlantic. As in
Scripps, plaintiff Atlantic used a product-by-process claim to
patent its product, a shoe innersole, and brought an infringe-
ment suit against a party that had distributed an innersole
similar to Atlantic's product This time, however, the panel
held that Atlantic's product-by-process claim could only be
infringed if the processes in question were sufficiently similar?
Atlantic plainly, if not explicitly, overruled Scripps.
By narrowly interpreting the scope of a product-by-process
claim, the Atlantic panel limited product protection to only
that product actually produced by the process claimed in the
patent. The Scripps panel, in contrast, interpreted the scope of
a product-by-process claim broadly, extending product protec-
tion to the claimed product regardless of the process by which
it was made." In short, the Atlantic panel pared the scope of
a product-by-process patent to that of a glorified process pat-
ent," while the Scripps panel treated it as the equivalent of a
Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583.
The court remanded to the lower court to determine whether the two prod-
ucts were sufficiently similar under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1584. For
an explanation of the doctrine of equivalents, see infra note 55 and accompanying
text.
s Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 836.
Id. at 846-47.
10 Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583. In her dissent to the denial of rehearing in At-
lantic, Judge Newman, the author of the Scripps opinion, alluded to a significant
restriction in her broad interpretation of product-by-process patents: prior to an
examiner decision on the validity of a product-by-process claim, the applicant
would be required to show the necessity for using that type of claim. Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). In contrast, the
Atlantic panel did not require a showing of necessity as they interpreted the scope
of the product-by-process claim narrowly.
Thus, both the Federal Circuit minority view as expressed by Judge Newman,
and the Federal Circuit majority view, as expressed by Judge Rader, would re-
strict the use of product-by-process claims. Judge Newman would restrict the use
of the claims procedurally, by requiring that the applicant show the necessity of
using the product-by-process claim, Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1298, while Judge Rader
would restrict the use of the claims substantively, by minimizing the protection
afforded by such a claim. Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 846-47.
" The scope of the product-by-process claim under the majority's view is slight-
ly broader than a process claim. Essentially, the protection is the same as a pro-
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conventional product patent.
This dissonance has two important consequences. First, it
engenders confusion in lower courts as to which decision pro-
vides the controlling law. Prior to rejecting Scripps, the Atlan-
tic panel stated: "A decision that fails to consider Supreme
Court precedent does not control if the court determines that
the prior panel would have reached a different conclusion if it
had considered controlling precedent."" These conflicting
opinions leave the precedential status of Atlantic and Scripps
in question and offer little guidance to lower courts.
Second, the conflict clouds an area of law in which stabili-
ty is crucial to investment decisions. The negative repercus-
sions of this instability will be especially felt in the biotechnol-
ogy industry. Driven by massive investment, the American
biotechnology industry has become the world leader in develop-
ing genetically engineered products.13 Two particular areas of
research, recombinant DNA 4 and molecular purification, 5
cess patent, except that a patentee may prevent others from importing into the
United States a product made in a foreign jurisdiction by using the process
claimed in the product-by-process claim. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying
text.
' Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 839 n.2. The court cited Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d
1030, 1035 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987), as supporting its rationale for not following the
precedent in Scripps. Tucker was a juvenile incarceration case that cited no au-
thority for its ruling. Id. In dissent of this view, Judge Rich cited an internal
Federal Circuit rule that "no precedent can be disregarded or overruled save by an
in banc court." Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1281 (Rich, J., dissenting). Further, Judge
Rich asserted another rule that states "where there are conflicting precedents, the
earlier precedent controls." Id.
1 Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the Pro-
crustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (1991); Cheryl D. Hardy,
Note, Patent Prosecution and Raw Materials: The Convention on Biological Diver-
sity and Its Implications for U.S. Policy on the Development and Commercialization
of Biotechnology, 15 U. PA. J. INTL BUS. L. 299, 302 (1993). The pharmaceutical
industry invested almost $11 billion in research and development in 1992. Roger
A. Brooks, Address Before the American Intellectual Property Law Association
(May 14, 1992), in AIPLA BULL., Apr.-June 1992, at 475; see also Philip Yip,
Product and Process Patent Protection in Biotechnology: Too Much or Too Little?,
17 J. CORP. L. 659, 661 (1992) (sales of bioengineered human pharmaceuticals
estimated te be $6 billion by the year 2000). One industry expert has predicted
that U.S. sales of biotechnology-derived products will reach $40 billion by the year
2000. Michael S. Greenfield, Note, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Strug-
gling with the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1992). Worldwide sales
could exceed $100 billion by that year. Id.
" DNA is an abbreviation for "deoxyribonucleic acid", the chemical compound of
which genetic material is composed. Recombinant DNA technology is the isolation
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have produced many significant discoveries. Significantly,
inventors in these industries often have little choice but to
patent their products by reference to the process used to manu-
facture it-i.e., by using a product-by-process claim. As a result
of the confusion generated in product-by-process patent law
following the Atlantic decision, companies that invest in bio-
technology may alter their investment strategies. 6
and replication of a desired gene of one species and insertion of it into the cells of
another species (host cells). The foreign gene takes proteins generated by the host
cell and codes or arranges them into a new product. Thus, the host cell becomes a
factory that produces proteins. Proteins produced by this process include insulin
for diabetics, a blood-clotting serum for hemophiliacs, and other important medical,
environmental and agricultural products.
For a discussion of the patent laws' impact on recent cases in recombinant
DNA technology, see Greenfield, supra note 13. See also Yusing Ko, Note, An
Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 783-89
(1992) (explanation of the production techniques of recombinantly derived prod-
ucts).
6 This type of technology involves isolating materials that occur naturally in
humans or other animals. For example, in an early case of this type, a patentee
sought to patent a purified version of human adrenalin. See Park-Davis & Co. v.
H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
" Investment in biotechnology is largely contingent on certainty in patent law.
See Burk, supra note 13, at 10-12.
Although the efficacy of patents in achieving [a "level playing field" be-
tween American and foreign biotechnology concerns and stimulating inno-
vation in biotechnology] remains a topic of legislative and academic de-
bate, one concrete fact is clear: patents are critical to the growth and
competitiveness of American biotechnology because patents are something
investors expect.
[I]nvestors are themselves reluctant to put money into biotechnology
ventures where the patent protection is lacking, or where the rights of
the patent holder are unclear. Investors are well aware that the enor-
mous costs of patent litigation may make serious inroads into the profit
margin of a small biotechnology firm.
Id. at 12; see also Kevin J. McGough & Daniel P. Burke, A Case for Expansive
Patent Protection of Biotechnology Inventions, 6 IARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 101 (1992)
("Since further [biotechnological] innovation will require great expense and labori-
ous research, investors need reasonable assurances that expansive product or prod-
uct-by-process patent protection will facilitate attractive returns on investment.");
Yip, supra note 13, at 688 (many biotech companies are small and lack financial
strength and thus require equitable patent laws to provide incentive to take risks).
While it is difficult to predict how a change in this area of law will affect
corporations, the cost of developing a new pharmaceutical product indicates that it
may be enormous. For example, the cost in 1990 dollars associated with taking a
new chemical entity from conception to market has increased five-fold since 1976,
from $54 million to approximately $230 million. Brooks, supra, note 13, at 475. An
illustration of the risk involved with pursuing the development of a new medicine
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Part I of this Comment reviews the history of product-by-
process claims and the standards used to determine patentabil-
ity and infringement. Part II then examines the Scripps and
Atlantic decisions, including the opinions generated by the
application for rehearing in Atlantic. Part III focuses on the
Atlantic panel's interpretations of early Supreme Court prod-
uct-by-process decisions and the dissents to the denial of re-
hearing in Atlantic. This section identifies how each side, using
the same case law, came to diametric conclusions, before it
explores the policy considerations that underlie the two posi-
tions. Part IV argues that precedent supports the Scripps
panel's interpretation of the scope of product-by-process claims
and asserts that courts should grant product-by-process claims
the same scope of protection afforded to conventional product
claims-to do otherwise when a patentee has satisfied a show-
ing of utility, novelty and nonobviousness, would be inequita-
ble. The Comment concludes therefore that the Patent and
Trademark Office should not require an inventor to prove a
specific need for claiming an invention with a product-by-pro-
cess claim.
I. PATENT BACKGROUND
A. The Origin of Patents
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."' Accordingly, the sec-
ond session of the First Congress established the patent sys-
tem by granting inventors certain exclusive rights" in their
inventions for a period of time, in exchange for the disclosure
is provided by Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association statistics, which estimate
that only one out of every 5000 to 10,000 compounds discovered ever makes it to
market. Id.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 6 (1966) ("Within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set
out conditions and tests for patentability.").
" A patent does not grant exclusive property rights in the patented subject
matter, only the right to exclude others from making, using and selling the pat-




of the invention to the public. 9 This system "reflects a bal-
ance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoid-
ance of monopolies which stifle competition without any con-
comitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful
Arts."'2 ° The patent system has since undergone many chang-
es, always with an eye to the original policies.
Under the current statute, patentable subject matter is
restricted to useful processes, machines, manufactures or com-
positions.2 Inventions containing patentable subject matter
also must display "novelty"22 and be "nonobvious"' to one of
ordinary skill in the particular art to which the invention per-
tains, at the time the invention was made. When an invention
satisfies these three requirements, the inventor may obtain a
patent for the final product, the starting material used to pro-
duce the final product, the process by which a final product is
made, or any combination of these categories.24
' Effective June 8, 1995, the grant of exclusive rights will begin on the date
the patent issues and end 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed. Pub. L. No. 103465, Title V §§ 532(a)(1), 534, 108 Stat. 4983,
4990 (1994). Previously, the grant of exclusive rights lasted 17 years from the
issue date. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (1988).
2 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
21 35 U.S.C. § 101.
' The requirement of "novelty" is extracted from § 102:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patent-
ed or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country,
more than one year prior to' the date of application for patent in the
United States ....
Id. § 102. Section 102(a) and (b) operates to "exclude from consideration for patent
protection knowledge that is already available to the public." Bonito Boats, 489
U.S. at 148.
S ee 35 U.S.C. § 103.
A patent may not be obtained . .. if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.
Id. The requirement of nonobviousness dictates that even if an invention is novel
and useful it will not qualify for patent protection "if its contours are so traced by
the existing technology in the field that the 'improvement is the work of the skill-
ful mechanic, not that of the inventor.'" Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150. (quoting
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851)).
' 35 U.S.C. § 100. The process of using a starting material also may be pat-
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The scope of protection offered by a patent corresponds to
the type of patent sought. Given the choice among different
categories under which to patent an invention, an inventor
naturally will opt for the patent category that grants the great-
est rights in the invention. Therefore, if possible, the inventor
will describe the invention as a product, because this method
grants the patentee the right to prevent others from making,
using or selling the product.' The other available forms of
patent grant lesser rights. For example, a process patent pre-
vents others from using or selling rights to employ a specific
process.26
To obtain a patent in any subject matter, the inventor
must negotiate a stringent application process known as patent
prosecution. The inventor submits an application to the Patent
and Trademark Office ('PTO") consisting of a specification, a
drawing and an oath.27 The inventor's specification must de-
scribe the invention in terms that would enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art of the invention to recreate the inven-
tion.' The specification must conclude with one or more
"claims" that specify and distinctly claim the subject matter
that the inventor regards as the invention.29 The claims serve
both to distinguish the invention from the prior art and to
define the scope of protection the patent will afford." A PTO
examiner scrutinizes the application to ensure it complies with
the statute before ruling on its validity."' An inventor who is
ented. See In re Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d 823, 825-26 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
35 U.S.C. § 154.
' During the patent application process, it remains uncertain whether the
product of a process will meet the requirements of novelty, usefulness and
nonobviousness. Thus, an inventor who submits a product claim may hedge that
claim with one which covers the process of making the product. See Yip, supra
note 13, at 678 ("A product-by-process claim is usually presented as a 'fall back' in
patent applications in case the product claim is rejected.").
27 35 U.S.C. § 111.
' The inventor must describe the "manner and process of making and using
[the invention], in such fll, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any per-
son skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same." Id. §
112.
2 Id.
"' In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("[C]laims are not technical descriptions of the disclosed inventions but are legal
documents like the descriptions of lands by metes and bounds in a deed which
define the area conveyed but do not describe the land.").
31 35 U.S.C. § 131.
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dissatisfied with the PTO's initial determination may request a
reexamination.2 If the patent is again rejected, the inventor
may pursue an appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, and ultimately, to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.3
In addition to the initial application, a patent's validity
also may be challenged during an infringement suit. 4 An al-
leged infringer may raise the question of the patent's validity
as a defense to an infringement action,35 or, alternatively, the
court may raise the issue while interpreting the scope of the
patent. Although these two circumstances involve different
procedures for determining validity, in either event a finding of
invalidity precludes infringement. In the case of a product
patent, regardless of how the patentability is challenged, the
determination hinges on whether at the time of the patent
application, the challenged product was novel and nonobvious
to those with ordinary skill in the art.36 In an infringement
proceeding, however, the challenged patent is presumed valid
because it already has satisfied the application process.37
In examining the validity of a patent, the court or examin-
er analyzes the language of the patent claim by considering
Id. § 132.
Id. §§ 134, 141.
'4 A patent holder brings an infringement suit to prevent another from making,
using or selling her patented invention. Essentially, the patent holder claims that
the infringer has copied her invention. To prove this allegation, the patentee at-
tempts to show that the product in question falls within the boundaries of her
invention (literal infringement) or that any difference between the two are insig-
nificant (doctrine of equivalents). Infringement is discussed more fully, infra notes
51-56 and accompanying text.
" This type of defense is common to nearly all infringement cases and was
used in both Scripps, 927 F.2d 1565, 1571-80 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and Atlantic, 970
F.2d at 836 (Faytex asserted that Atlantic's patent was invalid because the
innersole was on sale more than one year before the filing date of the patent
application).
35 U.S.C. § 103.
'7 See id. § 282. Section 282 provides: "A patent shall be presumed valid. Each
claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of
other claims. . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity." Id.
Where an infringer challenges the validity of a patent, the Federal Circuit
has adopted a burden of proof that requires the infringer to introduce clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing RCA v. Radio
Eng'g Labs, Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934)).
" The matter of claim adequacy or definiteness is a question of law. Morton
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the specification, the drawings and the prosecution history.3 9
Normally the claim will describe the invention by the product's
characteristics and structure. In some instances, however, the
patentee may claim a product by referring only to the pro-
cess. ° This type of claim is known as a product-by-process
patent.
B. Product-by-Process Patents
The statutes governing patents do not specify product-by-
process claims as a method of obtaining a patent.4' These
claims are a judicial construct that recognizes that due to the
limitations of language some products may be described only
by the process used to make it. In Ex parte Painter,42 the first
case to acknowledge the validity of of product-by-process
claims, Patent Commissioner Simonds described the predica-
Int'l v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Johnston v. IVAC
Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1989). For a general overview of the
rules on interpretation of patent claims, see Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384
F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
" Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397. The "prosecution history" (historically referred to
as the "file wrapper" history) includes the entire record of the proceedings in the
Patent Office, from the first application papers to the issued patent.
This record often is used to invoke "file wrapper" estoppel during Patent Of-
fice prosecutions and patent infringement litigation. File wrapper esteppel occurs
when a patent applicant is unable to convince the patent examiner that his inven-
tion meets the statutory requirements of novelty, utility and nonobviousness. After
the inventor's application is rejected, the applicant proceeds to insert limitations
and restrictions on the patent for the purpose of inducing the Patent Office to
grant the patent. When the patent is issued, the patentee is estopped from dis-
claiming the limitations and restrictions when attempting to determine the scope
of protection afforded to the invention. Id. at 398-99. See generally Kurt F. James,
Patent Claims and Prosecution History Estoppel in the Federal Circuit, 53 Mo. L.
REV. 497 (1988) (discussion of different approaches taken by the Federal Circuit
with regard to file wrapper estoppel).
"' A product is a machine, manufacture or composition. These are distinguished
from a process or method patent, which describes a new way of producing a prod-
uct.
41 That is, the patent statute does not list it as a method of obtaining a pat-
ent. The statute, however, also does not limit the means of describing a patent.
Moreover, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states: "An article may be
claimed by a process of making it provided it is definite." PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
706.03(e) (rev. ed. 1993) [hereinafter MPEP]. The MPEP is used as a guide by
PTO examiners in resolving patent applications.




[It requires no argument to establish the proposition that as a rule
a claim for an article of manufacture should not be defined by the
process of producing that article. On the other hand, when a man
has made an invention his right to a patent for it, or his right to
claim property defining it, is not to be determined by the limitations
of the English language. When the case arises that an article of
manufacture is a new thing, a useful thing, and embodies invention,
and that article cannot be properly defined and discriminated from
the prior art otherwise than by reference to the process of producing
it, a case is presented which constitutes a proper exception to the
rule.43
The Patent Office used the criterion of necessity to determine
patentability over many years and consistently was affirmed
by the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("CCPA")."
The necessity requirement has been relaxed somewhat in
recent years, relieving the applicant of proving an absolute
need for reciting the process. Indeed, as early as 1966, in In re
Bridgeford, the CCPA moved towards allowing product-by-pro-
cess claims without a showing of necessity.45 In Bridgeford,
3 Id. at 200-01.
"' See, e.g., In re Lifton, 189 F.2d 261, 263 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Shortell, 173
F.2d 993, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1949); In re McKee, 95 F.2d 264, 266 (C.C.P.A. 1938); In
re Butler, 37 F.2d 623, 626 (C.C.P.A. 1930); In re Brown, 29 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C.
Cir. 1928). For example, in In re Moeller, 117 F.2d 565 (C.C.P.A. 1941), a patent
applicant developed an improved method for producing molded cement products by
using corrugated sheets instead of woven fabric. The applicant was granted a
patent for the process of cement molding, but the product-by-process claim directed
at obtaining protection for the resulting cement product was rejected. Id. at 566.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that because the molded cement
articles could have been defined in terms of their physical and chemical character-
istics, the claim did not fall within the narrow exception afforded by a product-by-
process claim. Id. at 567; see also In re Johnson 394 F.2d 591 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
(court rejected product-by-process claims because the articles were capable of struc-
tural description, and so clearly did not fall into the "necessity" exception).
' 357 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1966). The appellant in Bridgeford attempted to
patent a type of wood by first claiming the product by a product-by-process claim
and then by a product claim. The appellant asserted that he needed the product
claim to properly protect his invention because a product claim is broader in scope
than the product-by-process claim and does not contain any process limitations. Id.
at 681. The court relied on statutory language to deny the appellant the opportu-
nity to patent the same subject matter by two different methods. The court ac-
knowledged, however, that other courts have "construed [product-by-process] claims
as covering only a product made by the particular process set forth in the claim
and not to the product per se." Id. at 683. Thus, without ruling on future infringe-
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the court found that the method used to define the invention is
not dispositive of the type of protection granted it. According to
the Bridgeford court:
Whether the invention be defined in terms of the structure of the
compound, or its novel physical characteristics, or by defining it in
terms of the process by which it is produced or in a proper case, by
employing more than one of these methods of defining the invention,
the right to a patent on the invention is the ultimate consider-
ation. . . . "In a proper case" does not mean that an applicant must
prove the impossibility of defining the invention other than by using
more than one of the above methods. 6
The court's focus of inquiry therefore shifted from the necessity
of describing the process to determining first whether the in-
vention, and more specifically the product, was patentable and,
second, whether the claim met the statutory requirements.
Subsequent cases followed the reasoning in Bridgeford,
holding that the patent statutes do not limit how a patent
applicant claims his or her invention, so long as it is "defi-
nite."47 Whether a product-by-process claim is definite de-
pends on the patentability of the product itself." Thus, the
court or examiner does not evaluate whether the stated process
is novel or nonobvious, but instead scrutinizes the product
produced by that process. In 1974, in In re Hughes, the CCPA
dispelled any confusion over the propriety of utilizing product-
ment matters, the court intimated that the scope of the patent may be limited
because the patentee had submitted the product-by-process claim first.
46 Id. at 682-83.
' See In re Steppan, 394 F.2d 1013, 1019 (C.C.PA. 1967). The appellant in
Steppan argued that a claim was invalid because it was in an improper form, i.e.,
a product-by-process claim. The court held that the relevant inquiry in determining
the appropriateness of a claim is whether it complies with § 112 of Title 35: "The
problem, in essence, is thus one of determining who shall decide how best to state
what the invention is. By statute, 35 U.S.C. § 112, Congress has placed no limita-
tions on how an applicant claims his invention, as long as the specification con-
cludes with claims which particularly point out and distinctly claim that inven-
tion." Id. (emphases added). See also In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345 (C.C.PA.
1969), where the court reversed the Patent Office's rejection of a claim for a glass
product. The Patent Office had stated that the glass could have been claimed
without resorting to a process description. Id. at 1346-47. It held, however, that as
the qualities of the glass were not "particularly susceptible to definition by the
conventional recitation of properties or structure," the product-by-process claims
were valid. Id. at 1349 (footnote omitted).
In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the determination of product-by-
process claims is based on the product itself).
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by-process claims.49 The CCPA stated that even if the product
can be defined broadly without process limitations, product-by-
process claims are permissible as a hedge against invalidity of
the broader product claims. 0
As with all patent claims, if a product-by-process claim
does not clearly delineate what the patentee claims as his
invention, others cannot avoid inadvertently infringing the
patent.5' As a result, the Patent Office is particulary wary of
inadequate product-by-process claims during the application
process. The examiner may require an applicant to demon-
strate the difference between the subject of the product-by-
process claim and a sufficiently similar product that exists in
the prior art. If the products are either identical or only slight-
ly different, the examiner may reject the application for non-
obviousness or for a lack of novelty.52 This policy results from
the practical limitations of the application process; namely that
the PTO lacks the resources and capability to manufacture
products by the processes described in product-by-process
claims in order to make physical comparisons to products that
496 F.2d 1216 (C.C.PA. 1974).
" Id. at 1219. More recently, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit im-
plicitly reaffirmed that a product could be claimed by way of a product-by-process
claim. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 158-59
n.* (1989) ("As long as the end product of the process is adequately defined and
novel and nonobvious, a patent in the process may support a patent in the result-
ing product."); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("a chemical
material can be claimed by means of a process"). Hughes, however, raised the
policy issue of the public's interest in clearly-defined claims, which generally work
against allowing product-by-process claims.
One cannot read the words of the claim on an article unless he is able
to find out how the article was made. Therefore, there may be a sound
policy reason behind the rule, as a general proposition, requiring articles
to be defined without reference to process. It is a rule of public conve-
nience and we have, therefore, often approved its application.
Hughes, 496 F.2d at 1218.
" Judge Rader argued that as a product-by-process claim refers only to the
process, the claimed product is necessarily indefinite. See Atlantic, 970 F.2d 834,
846 (1992) ("to disregard the claim limitations also would require this court to
determine infringement by comparing an accused product with an embodiment of
the claims, not the claims themselves").
12 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states: "When the prior art dis-
closes a product which reasonably appears to be either identical with or only
slightly different than a product claimed in a product-by-process claim, a rejection
based alternatively on either section 102 [novelty] or 103 [nonobviousness] of the
statute is appropriate." NPEP, supra note 41, at § 706.03(e).
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exist in the prior art. The PTO therefore carries a lesser bur-
den of proof to make out a case of prima facie obviousness in
product-by-process claims than in a conventional product
claim.5 3
In addition to the patentability issue, a product-by-process
patent presents a unique problem for the courts during in-
fringement proceedings. In a standard product patent infringe-
ment case, the court first examines whether the alleged in-
fringing device is identical-whether it literally infringes. 4 If
the product does not literally infringe, the court next deter-
mines whether the accused product is equivalent to the patent-
ed product; that is, whether the device "performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to obtain
substantially the same result."5 Although courts use the
same standard as an ordinary product case to determine in-
fringement of a product-by-process patent, they lack a descrip-
tion of the initial product to compare to the alleged infringing
product. 6 This difficulty is the primary reason behind the
' Id. To avoid the potential problem of obviousness faced during either the
patent application process or infringement proceedings, commentators have advised
adding sufficient information to a claim so that it avoids the product-by-process
label and becomes a "fingerprint" claim. Rochelle K. Seide & Andrew S. Reiskind,
Drafting Claims for Biotechnology Inventions, in PLI PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE-
MARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK 383, 391 (1992) (Series No.
353). Rather than claiming a product by describing its. structure, a "fingerprint"
claim claims the product by its characteristics; e.g., claiming a chemical compound
by mass-spectrometry and infra-red readings. Id. at n.113.
" Literal infringement occurs when the infringing product or process claim
contains the same limitations contained in the patented product or process.
Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1178 (1991). For example, when a pat-
ented product is claimed as "comprised of A, B and C, " and the product accused
of infringement contains A, B and D, the accused product does not literally in-
fringe. The accused product may, however, infringe under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.
' Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 38 F.3d 1192, 1196 (Fed. Cir.
1994). The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable device which recognizes that
future infringers may alter their claim slightly and thereby fall outside the literal
scope of the original patentee's claim. Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods.,
339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). The Court of Claims has phrased the concern underlying
the requirement of literal infringement adeptly: 'To allow literality to satisfy the
test for infringement would force the patent law to reward literary skill and not
mechanical creativity." Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 399. The doctrine of equivalents al-
lows courts to overlook words which may unnecessarily limit the scope of a patent
in view of the disclosed invention, the prior art and the actions of the patent
examiner. Even where the product does not literally infringe a claim of a patent,
it infringes the patented product if it essentially appropriates the invention.
" Some courts have touched on the problem of defining the scope of a product-
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Atlantic panel's decision to limit product-by-process claims to
products made by the process described in the patent.
II. TAKE OFF THE GLOVES: DISAGREEMENT WITEIN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The collegial existence of the Federal Circuit was altered
dramatically when Judge Randall Rader handed down Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.,57 which implicitly over-
ruled Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech,
Inc.," a decision written by Judge Pauline Newman just one
term earlier. The denial of rehearing in Atlantic prompted both
sides of the controversy to release opinions stating their posi-
tions on the scope of product-by-process patents. The dispute
started innocently enough: Judge Newman's Scripps opinion
contained only two paragraphs dealing with a product-by-pro-
cess issue.59
by-process patent. In In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1966), while dis-
cussing the implications of double patenting the same subject matter, the CCPA
stated: "While there is some language in Freeman to support the contention that a
product-by-process type claim differs only 'in scope' from a process type claim and
they therefore 'are directed to a single invention,' so far as this is inconsistent
with our holding here it must be overruled." Id. at 683 n.6. The court explicitly
acknowledged that although the product and product-by-process claims define the
same patentable subject matter, the patents themselves differ in scope. Id. at 683.
The court therefore intimated that a product-by-process patent is not equivalent to
a product patent. This discussion, however, is pure dicta, as the court had to
decide only whether double patenting had occurred, not the scope of the patent.
One article concerning product-by-process patents suggests that a product-by-
process patent is literally infringed only when the process defined by the claim is
used to make the infringing product. See Lawrence A. Hymo and Richard A. An-
derson, Product-by-Process Claims: Time for Reexamination, 3 FED. CIR. BAR J. 131
(1993). Thus, it may be argued that if the scope of a product-by-process claim in-
cludes the product of the process, then infringement only can occur under a doc-
trine of equivalents analysis.
970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Judge Newman's opinion mainly was devoted to analyzing Scripps' product
claims and Genentech's defenses. Genentech claimed inter alia that Scripps' patent
claims were unenforceable for the following reasons: Scripps engaged in inequitable
conduct during the patent process, id. at 1571-74; Scripps did not provide suffi-
cient information about the invention to enable another with ordinary skill in the
field to make and use the invention without undue experimentation, id.; Scripps
did not properly reissue the patent, id. at 1574-76; the patents were anticipated
by the prior art, id. at 1576-78; and Scripps did not provide the best mode to
produce the invention, id. at 1578-80. Only two paragraphs of the 19-page opinion
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In 1983, Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation ("Scripps")
brought an infringement suit against Genentech, Inc. Scripps
owned a patent that claimed a product, a protein used to treat
hemophilia, and the process used to produce the protein, by
using product-by-process claims and process claims respective-
ly." Scripps contended that Genentech, which had discovered
an alternative method of producing the protein by using a
process involving recombinant DNA, had infringed Scripps'
patent either literally or by application of the doctrine of equiv-
alents.6
During the litigation Scripps's motion for summary judg-
ment on the infringement of its product-by-process claims was
denied on the ground that its claims had not been infringed
unless Genentech used the same process to produce the protein
identified in the Scripps patent. 2 Scripps appealed and the
Federal Circuit determined that the district court's finding
"appears to diverge from our precedent."63 Writing for the
panel, Judge Newman acknowledged that although the prece-
dent from which the district court diverged "arose in the con-
text of patent prosecution, not patent infringement[,] ....
[s]ince claims must be construed the same way for validity and
for infringement, the correct reading of product-by-process
claims is that they are not limited to product prepared by the
process set forth in the claims."64 A product-by-process patent
thus protects the product as broadly as if it had been claimed
under a product patent. In short, the court considered the pro-
tection granted products patented by conventional product
claims to be no different from that granted to products patent-
ed through a product-by-process claim.
were devoted to infringement of the product-by-process claims.
" Id. at 1569. The protein was termed Factor VfI:C. Scripps' claims to the
blood-clotting factor were product-by-process claims. Claim 13 is a representative
claim: "Highly purified and concentrated human or porcine VIEI:C prepared in
accordance with the method of claim 1." Id. at 1570. Claim 1 describes a process
of producing Factor V]II:C by purifying existing Factor VIII:C from human or pig
blood. Id.
" Id. at 1583. For a discussion of literal infringement and the doctrine of
equivalents, see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
" Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379,
1386-87 (N.D. Cal. 1987).




Although the district court had misstated the standard,
Judge Newman found that its conclusion had been correct: the
summary judgment motion on infringement was properly de-
nied because a question remained as to whether the products
were equivalent.65 The court directed that on remand the in-
fringement analysis should not hinge on whether Genentech
had used the same process to produce the protein, but should
attempt to determine whether the product made by Genentech
avoided infringing Scripps' patent by the reverse doctrine of
equivalents.66
The following year, Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex
Corp.67 presented a situation similar to Scripps, although for
a low-tech application-Atlantic owned a patent for a shock-
absorbing shoe innersole. As in Scripps, Atlantic's patent
claimed both the process for making the product6 and the
" Id. at 1583-84.
cc Id. at 1581, 1583-84. 'The so-called 'reverse doctrine of equivalents' is an
equitable doctrine invoked in applying properly construed claims to an accused
device. Just as the purpose of the 'doctrine of equivalents' is to prevent 'pirating'
of the patentee's inventionL] . . . so the purpose of the 'reverse' doctrine is to
prevent unwarranted extension of the claims beyond the fair scope of the
patentee's invention." Id. at 1581. If an accused article is within the literal words
of a claim, it may avoid infringement if it is "so far changed in principle from a
patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially
different way." Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09
(1950).
67 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
66 Claim 1 of the patent defined the process as:
In a method of manufacturing a shock-absorbing, molded innersole for
insertion in footwear, which method comprises:
(a) introducing an expandable, polyurethane into a mold, and
(b) recovering from the mold an innersole which comprises a con-
toured heel and arch section composed of a substantially open-
celled polyurethane foam material, the improvement which compris-
es:
(i) placing an elastomeric insert material into the mold, the
insert material having greater sock-absorbing properties and
being less resilient than the molded, open-celled polyurethane
foam material, and the insert material having sufficient sur-
face tack to remain in the placed position in the mold on the
introduction of the expandable polyurethane material so as to
permit the expandable polyurethane material to expand
about the insert material without displacement of the insert
material- and
(ii) recovering a molded innersole with the insert material
having a tacky surface forming a part of the exposed bottom
surface of the recovered innersole.
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product itself through a product-by-process claim.69 Atlantic
brought an infringement suit against Faytex for distributing
innersoles similar to those patented by Atlantic. Faytex's
innersoles were manufactured by two different companies,
using two different processes.7" The district court found in-
fringement by Faytex only where the product was produced by
a process similar to the one described in the Atlantic claim. 1
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, a panel of judges who
had not participated in the Scripps decision agreed with the
district court infringement findings. Writing for the panel,
Judge Rader held that the scope of a product-by-process claim
is not the same as that of a product claim; rather, the scope of
a product-by-process claim is limited by its process terms.72
Judge Rader stated that the Scripps panels reading of the case
law was not controlling because it had "ruled without reference
to the Supreme Court's previous cases involving product claims
with process limitations."" Furthermore, he maintained that
the "invitation [to follow Scripps] would require this court to
directly ignore basic patent principles."74
Judge Rader concentrated on digesting those early Su-
preme Court cases that he asserted the Scripps panel had
ignored.75 He then briefly examined relevant district court
decisions and commentators' analyses before reviewing PTO
and CCPA precedent. The panel concluded that "courts regard-
Id. at 835-36.
" The product claim stated: 'The molded innersole produced by the method of
claim 1." Id. at 836.
7 Id. The manufacturers were Surge Products, Inc. and Sorbothane, Inc. The
district court found that while the innersoles made by Surge infringed Atlantic's
patent, Sorbothane's innersoles did not. Id.
"1 Id.; see Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., No. 88-0210-H (D. Mass.
July 27, 1990).
72 Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 846-47.
7s Id. at 839 n.2. The court cited an Eleventh Circuit case to support its deci-
sion to contradict the prior Federal Circuit panelrs opinion: "A decision that fails
to consider Supreme Court precedent does not control if the court determines that
the prior panel would have reached a different conclusion if it had considered
controlling precedent. See Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n.7 (11th Cir.
1987)." Id. See infra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pro-
priety of the Tucker analysis.
' 970 F.2d at 846. "This court, therefore, rejects Atlantic's invitation to ignore
the process limitations in its product-by-process claims." Id. at 847.




ed the language in product-by-process claims as limiting the
claim.
76
Judge Rader recognized that by limiting a product-by-pro-
cess patent to the process, the panel was allowing the claim to
be treated differently in litigation than in the initial applica-
tion proceeding. He justified this disparate treatment by as-
serting that it accommodated the demands of the administra-
tive process during application while also recognizing the capa-
bilities of trial courts during litigation.7 In other words, al-
though "claims mean the same for infringement and validity,"
the PTO and courts treat claims differently because of their
dissimilar abilities to address this type of determination:"8 the
PTO "gives claims the broadest reasonable meaning when
determining patentability," while courts "consult the specifica-
tion, prosecution history, prior art and other claims to deter-
mine the proper construction of the claim language."79
Judge Rader also recognized that treating the product-by-
process claims as product claims would create two problems.
First, it would require courts to ignore the limitations de-
scribed in the product-by-process claim, a practice that "would
clash with basic patent principles."8 Second, ignoring the
claim limitations would require courts to measure infringe-
ment by comparing the alleged infringing device with an em-
bodiment of the claims, rather than the actual claims them-
selves."l
Judge Newman's dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc
did not concentrate on what the correct interpretation of Atlan-
tic should have been. Instead, she limited her review of cases
to those cited by the Atlantic panel to "explain why the ques-
tion [in Atlantic] should have been taken en banc."8 2 While
surveying the relevant Supreme Court precedent, Judge
Newman declared that although dicta in some cases suggested,
at times correctly, limitations based on the process when deal-
76 Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 845.




81 Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 846.
Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1293 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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ing with a product-by-process claim,' the Supreme Court had
not decided a case that was factually similar to Scripps. Judge
Newman reasoned that since the Supreme Court had not ruled
upon a situation where the product was new and patented by a
product-by-process claim, the CAFC was free to consider this
factual situation in a manner consistent with Supreme Court
precedent.'
In addition to disputing the majority's interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent, Judge Newman's opinion contained
two interesting contentions. First, she maintained that the
bulk of the Atlantic opinion was dicta because under the facts
of the case, it was unnecessary for the court to consider the
validity of Scripps. Second, her opinion implied that the paten-
tee should be allowed to claim a product via a product-by-pro-
cess claim only after proving the need to use such a claim by
showing the impossibility of defining the product in a conven-
tional sense.
Judge Newman's dissent demonstrated the weakness and
overreaching of the majority opinion. Prior to scrutinizing the
Supreme Court precedent, Judge Newman had raised an argu-
ment that would eliminate the need for lengthy analysis. She
asserted that the types of claims in Scripps and Atlantic were
distinguishable and, therefore, that the Atlantic panel had
overruled Scripps unnecessarily.85 She postulated three possi-
ble combinations of claims that contain both product and pro-
cess terms:
(1) when the product is new and unobvious, but is not capable of
independent definition;
8' See General Elec. v. Wabash Appliance Co., 304 U.S. 364, 373 (1938);
Cochrane v. BASF, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884); see supra notes 119-31, 140-44 and
accompanying text.
Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1289.
Id. at 1283 ("[I]t is apparent that there is no need whatsoever for the con-
flict that the Atlantic panel created. The claims in Atlantic and those of Scripps
are different classes of claims, with a long history recognizing the difference.").
Judges Rich and Lourie also dealt with a related issue in their dissents. Judge
Lourie commented: "The patentee in this case itself characterized [the claim] as
being limited to the process by which the claimed innersole was made. An inven-
tor determines what he or she regards as his or her invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112."
Id. at 1299 (Lourie, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Rich
agreed: "There was, therefore, no occasion to review the law to determine how the
claim should be construed. It was not an issue in the case." Id. at 1280 (Rich, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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(2) when the product is old or obvious, but the process is new;
(3) when the process is new and unobvious, but has a process-based
limitation (e.g. a "molded" product)."'
Judge Newman placed the Scripps claims in the first
class-termed "true" product-by-process claims-because the
product patented (purified blood-clotting protein) was new and
the patentee could not describe it without reference to the
purification process. 7  In contrast, according to Judge
Newman, Atlantic's claims fell into the second catego-
ry-"product of the process" claims-because during the prose-
cution of the original patent, Atlantic had argued to the PTO
that their claims were patentable solely on the basis of the
process, thereby estopping them from claiming the product."8
Although the prosecution history had acknowledged that the
product was old, 9 the process used to create the innersoles
still was found to be new." Thus, Judge Newman argued that
the Atlantic panel should have limited itself to ruling on the
second type of claims, and should not have addressed the va-
lidity of Scripps."
Judge Newman's argument for re-establishing the necessi-
ty requirement was grounded on the fact-sensitive quality of
the cases decided by the CCPA, the Court of Claims and the
Supreme Court. These cases all required courts to "approach[ ]
claim interpretation in the classical way: they... consider[ ]
' Id. at 1284. Judge Newman's categories are drawn from an insightful article
by Eric Mirabel entitled Product-By-Process: A Practical Perspective, 68 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SocYr 3 (1986). Mirabel describes three separate categories of
claims that form a claims spectrum: "true" product-by-process claims (where the
product is described primarily by process terms), product claims with a process
limitation, and product claims with a structural limitation. Id. at 4-11.
Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1284.
Id. at 1281. "Atlantic was estopped by the prosecution history from taking
the position that these claims are free of process limitations, for Atlantic had
argued to the examiner that these claims were patentable solely because the pro-
cess had been examined and found patentable." Id. at 1282 (emphasis added). See
supra note 39 for a discussion of prosecution history estoppel.
Judge Rader responded to this argument in his concurrence to the denial of
rehearing. He stated that Atlantic did not limit its claim to a process; they had,
in fact, claimed the product. Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1301. Furthermore, he stated,
the prosecution history did not show that Atlantic limited itself to claiming the
process. Id.
974 F.2d at 1301.
" Id. at 1282.
" "The stretch of the Atlantic panel to reach out for the Scripps decision is
unnecessary in law, as well as incorrect in practice." Id. at 1283.
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the specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art."92
While her review of the CCPA was comprehensive, 9
Judge Newman failed to cite the broader language contained in
In re Hughes.94 In Hughes, the CCPA suggested that a prod-
uct still could be claimed by reference to the process used to
make it even if it was possible to claim the product without
such reference. 95 Judge Newman instead emphasized the pro-
priety of claiming the product by way of the process only when
necessity required it. 96 In effect, while arguing for the validity
of product-by-process claims, she limited their use to cases
which could prove the need for their use. After examining
nearly all relevant precedent concerning product-by-process
patents (excluding the important language in Hughes), Judge
Newman stated: "The Painter [necessity] rule is a practical
solution to an important problem, whereby law and practice
are adapted to complex products in order to implement the
purposes of the patent law. This rule continues to serve the
purposes of the law."97
III. WHICH IS THE PRECEDENT THAT BINDS?
The net result of the profusion of opinions in Atlantic is
confusion in the lower courts as to which precedent is control-
ling. While the most recent precedent normally is considered
binding, the Atlantic panel's undermining of the Scripps deci-
sion is far from the typical technique employed to modify earli-
er precedent. Rather than factually distinguishing Scripps, or
defining a new rule that could apply either to Scripps or Atlan-
tic,98 Judge Rader instead chose to ignore Scripps altogether.
He justified this treatment by a footnote citation to an Elev-
92 Id. at 1284.
' Judge Newman surveyed the CCPA cases that laid the groundwork for the
acceptance of "true" product-by-process patents. Id. at 1285-89; see supra notes 41-
50 and accompanying text.
14 496 F.2d 1216, 1218 (C.C.PA. 1974); see supra text accompanying note 49-
50.
" See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
'6 Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1288.
97 Id.
" See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-16 (1992) (Justice




enth Circuit juvenile incarceration case, Tucker v. Phyfer,99
which held that a panel is not bound by a prior panel's deci-
sion if it determines that the prior panel would have reached a
different conclusion had it considered controlling prece-
dent.100
This unusual maneuver prompted an outcry from the dis-
senters to the denial of the rehearing in Atlantic. Judge Rich
cited two internal Federal Circuit rules which he claimed pre-
served the precedential value of Scripps. First he noted that
"no precedent can be disregarded or overruled save by an in
banc court." 1' The judge also asserted that "where there are
two conflicting precedents, the earlier precedent controls.""0 '
Thus, the conflicting precedent and conflicting opinions on its
value leave lower courts without guidance as to which decision
to follow.0 3
" 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987).
100 Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 839 n.2. In Tucker, however, the panel noted that the
prior panel failed to consider two specific Supreme Court cases that would have
required the same conclusion reached by the Tucker panel. Conversely, in Atlantic
the allegedly ignored Supreme Court precedent by no means requires a different
ruling from that found in Scripps, nor is there proof that the Scripps panel did
not consider the Supreme Court precedent. In fact, the district court in Scripps
forcefully argued that a product-by-process claim is limited to the process based on
precedent from the Supreme Court (Cochrane v. BASF) and two circuit courts.
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1386-87
(ND. Cal. 1987). Thus, the Scripps panel did not fail to consider the Supreme
Court cases. To suggest that the situation in Scripps was like that in Tucker is,
at best, disingenuous.
"' Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1281 (Rich, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
102 Id.
10 The only lower court to elect between the precedent followed the Atlantic
panel. See Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993). Following
the pattern established in Scripps and Atlantic, Tropix brought suit against
Lumigen claiming infringement of its patent for a purified chemiluminescent, wa-
ter-soluble derivative. Lumigen produced the derivative by a different process than
the process described in the Tropix claim. Tropix, relying on Scripps, claimed that
its patent was infringed whenever the derivative product was manufactured, re-
gardless of the process. Id. at 7. Lumigen, on the other hand, placed its faith in
the Atlantic decision, which would not find infringement where the defendant
manufactured the same product by a different process. Id. at 8.
The district court resolved the conflict based upon its prediction of the
precedential effect that the Federal Circuit will give to each of the cases. Id. The
court pronounced that it did not find any prior authority for the propositions set
forth by the Scripps decision and thus concluded that even on the confused state
of the record, a majority of the judges on the Federal Circuit would rule that
Atlantic states the controlling law. Id. The district court failed to discuss the mer-
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The majority may have anticipated the confusion which
would develop surrounding its interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent. Judge Rader's majority opinion addressed this issue
in a footnote where he stated that the conclusion of the Scripps
panel could be examined anew because it had failed to consider
Supreme Court precedent."4 Accordingly, Judge Rader devot-
ed the bulk of his opinion to reviewing Supreme Court cases in
which products were claimed by using process terms.
In response to Judge Rader's challenge, Judge Newman's
dissent focused in part on distinguishing the Supreme Court
precedent that she had "overlooked" in Scripps. In short, she
claimed that the Supreme Court never had considered a prod-
uct-by-process claim for a new product akin to that found in
Scripps; therefore, any discussion related to product-by-process
claims in the Supreme Court cases cited by Judge Rader was
dicta."'
Initially, Judge Rader's view of Supreme Court precedent
is persuasive insofar as much of the language of the cases sup-
ports his position. A closer examination of the precedent, how-
ever, reveals that Judge Newman's view of the cases is closer
to their true import. The first set of cases considered by both
Judges Rader and Newman dated from 1876 and involved a
patent granted for false teeth with a rubber base. Judge Rader
borrowed the Court's language from two earlier decisions-the
Goodyear decisions-to support his claim that a product-by-
process patent would be infringed only if the same process
were used to produce the allegedly infringing product. This
rationale is flawed, however, because unlike Scripps, the Good-
year cases did not involve a new product.
In Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.,' Smith
challenged the validity of a patent claiming a "plate of hard
its of the arguments presented in both Scripps and Atlantic, instead basing its
decision on the votes to rehear Atlantic.
' See Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 838-39 n.2. Most of the Supreme Court precedent
at issue in Atlantic dates to the late nineteenth century. Although early Supreme
Court precedent rarely plays a significant role in most areas of the law, in patent
law it often is important due to a lack of modern precedent. See Harold C.
Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine Patent Infringe-
ment in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 1, 24-25 (1992).
'os Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1289.
106 93 U.S. 486 (1876).
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rubber, or vulcanite, or its equivalent, for holding artificial
teeth, or teeth and gums, substantially as described.""7 The
false teeth in Smith were given patent protection because the
introduction of the rubber component was novel, even though
false teeth had existed before the Goodyear patent was issued.
Although false teeth previously had existed in a different form,
the Supreme Court held that the process and the product of
that process both exhibited the requisite novelty to support a
patent.
108
Four years later, the court in Goodyear Dental Vulcanite
Co. v. Davis"°9 was required to limit the patent protection to
the process and the resulting product. In Davis, the defendant
had manufactured its false teeth with celluloid instead of rub-
ber. As the process was different, the Court held that there
was no infringement of the Goodyear patent.1 The Court
107 Smith v Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 493 (1876). In Smith,
the Court interpreted the phrase "substantially as described" to mean "formed as
described." Id. Therefore, as the process was not included as an independent claim,
the process as described in the specification was incorporated into the claim. "The
claim refers in terms to the antecedent description, without which it cannot be
understood. The process detailed is thereby made as much a part of the invention
as are the materials of which the product is composed." Id.
"' The Court, however, was explicit in limiting the patent protection to just the
process and the product it produces:
tihe invention, then, is a product or manufacture made in a defined
manner. It is not a product alone separated from the process by which it
is created. The claim refers in terms to the antecedent description [of the
process], without which it cannot be understood. The process detailed is
thereby made as much a part of the invention as are the materials of
which the product is composed.
Id. at 493. Because false teeth existed in the prior art, the Court was constrained
to granting protection only for the process and the product made by that process.
109 102 U.S. 222 (1880). In Davis, Goodyear claimed that Davis infringed the
patent it had gained in Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. Davis manufac-
tured artificial teeth by a process that used celluloid rather than rubber as the
material in which the teeth were embedded. In addition, the process Davis used to
embed teeth into the base material was different. Rather than starting with a soft
material such as rubber, which hardened with the application of heat, Davis start-
ed with celluloid, a hard material that was heated to allow the teeth to be insert-
ed into it and then allowed to harden as it cooled.
11 The Goodyear cases illustrate the problem that arises when text is divorced
from context. While the Court seemed to grant a product patent in Smith, it rec-
ognized in an infringement context that the initial product was not new. The prod-
uct had existed in the prior art, although not made of a rubber material. The
correct construction of the patent therefore was to limit the scope of the patent to
the process and the product of that process. In fact, in Smith, the Court deter-
mined that "[tihe invention, then is a product or manufacture made in a defined
1718 [Vol. 60: 1693
PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS PATENTS
narrowed the patent's scope to the process and the product
made by the process by reading Goodyear's process of manufac-
turing the dental plate as a limitation on the claim"' and
stating that
when a product arrived at by certain defined stages or processes is
patented, only those things can be considered equivalents for the
elements of the manufacture which perform the same way. The
same result may be reached by different processes, each of them
patentable, and one process is not infringed by the use of any num-
ber of its stages less than all of them."
Therefore, as Davis' celluloid process did not involve vulcaniza-
tion, the Court did not find an infringement of Goodyear's
patent.
The next case considered by Judges Rader and Newman
was Merrill v. Yeomans.' Judge Rader used Merrill to illus-
trate a pattern of strict claim interpretation in Supreme Court
precedent. In Merrill, the Court looked at the entire claim to
interpret the scope of a patent involving a deodorized oil that
Merrill claimed Yeomans had infringed. The patentee de-
scribed the process in minute detail in the specification and
described the product by referring to the process: "I claim the
above-described new manufacture of the deodorized heavy
hydrocarbon oils,.., by treating them substantially as is here-
inbefore described."" 4 After examining the construction of
the entire claim, the Court interpreted "manufacture" to refer
to the process, not the product, and therefore found that the
claim protected the process only."' On this basis, Judge
manner. It is not a product alone separated from the process by which it is creat-
ed." 93 U.S. at 493.
m "The material is, so far as possible, restricted to a substance either vulca-
nized or capable of vulcanization." Davis, 102 U.S. at 226.
U2 Id. at 230.
m 94 U.S. 568 (1876).
... Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 571. This case stands for the proposition that the claim will be inter-
preted strictly according to its content in order to protect the public. According to
the Merrill Court,
[tihe growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a century in this
country has reached a stage in its progress where the variety and magni-
tude of the interests involved require accuracy, precision, and care in the
preparation of all the papers on which the patent is founded.... The
developed and improved condition of the patent law, and of the principles
which govern the exclusive rights conferred by it, leave no excuse for
1995]
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Rader claimed that Merrill supported the limitation of product-
by-process patent protection to the process. In response, Judge
Newman asserted that the Atlantic panel had misapplied
Merrill. Judge Newman instead interpreted Merrill as holding
that since the deodorized oil had been an old product, the pat-
ent protection was limited to the process."'
The language of Merrill, however, does not support either
argument. Nowhere in its decision does the Merrill Court de-
scribe the product as old. In addition, the Court did not hold
that the word "manufacture" necessarily limited the patent to
the process. Rather, Merrill was decided, as the Court stated,
"solely upon a correct construction of the plaintiffs patent, and
the accompanying specifications." 17
Regardless of the spin each judge placed on the Merrill
decision, the Merrill Court did not foreclose the possibility that
a new, properly claimed product, patented by a product-by-
process claim, could be infringed if someone were to produce
the product by a different process. The Merrill Court stated
that if the patent claimed "was for a new oil,... the defen-
dants may be liable [as infringers].""' Alternatively, if the
patent claimed only the process, the defendants would not
infringe because they did not use the claimed process. The
Court therefore had found that the patent did not claim the
product, but instead claimed the process used to manufacture
the product so that determining the scope of a new product
was unnecesary. It is unclear, however, whether the Court
would have concluded that the defendant had infringed if the
term "manufacture" had been interpreted to mean the product.
The next disputed precedent, Cochrane v. BASF, presented
the Supreme Court with a case that seemingly tested the lim-
its of product-by-process claims."' As in Merrill and Good-
ambiguous language or vague descriptions. The public should not be
deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told
what it is that limits these rights. The genius of the inventor ... should
not be restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in exist-
ing patents ....
Id. at 573.
"' Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Co., 974 F.2d 1279, 1289-90 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
117 Merrill, 94 U.S. at 569.
"s Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
111 U.S. 293 (1884).
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year, the patentee in BASF had described the process used to
make its product and had relegated the product description to
merely a paragraph. The product claim added one twist, how-
ever. It claimed a dye "produced from anthracine or its deriva-
tives by either of the methods herein described, or by any other
method which will produce a like result."120 BASF argued
that by specifying the dye as they had, the claim covered the
dye, regardless of the process used to manufacture it. Never-
theless, the Court once again found the patent protection limit-
ed to the process and the product made by that process.
121
Given the factual situation, the BASF Court took a compli-
cated approach to a simple question. The Court unnecessarily
used language which, when read literally, restricts the scope of
product-by-process claims to the process. 22 A close examina-
tion of the case, however, reveals that the language is dic-
ta." BASF explicitly claimed an entire product, a dye, al-
though the claim only cited a process used to make the prod-
uct.12 The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not
guilty of infringement unless the plaintiff could show that the
defendant had used the same process cited in the plaintiff's
claim."
Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
, Id. at 311. In BASF, the defendant, Cochrane, produced the dye by a sulfu-
ric reaction process rather than by the bromine reaction process used by BASF.
Although the BASF claim explicitly claimed the product, the Court focused on the
ramifications of allowing a patentee to claim a product while only referring to the
process used to make it. The Court stated that there was no way for a court to
determine if another process would produce the exact same product. Therefore, the
Court found that "unless it is shown that the [patented] process . . . was followed
to produce the defendant's article, or unless it is shown that that article could not
be produced by any other process, the defendant's article cannot be identified as
the product of the [patented] process." Id. at 310.
12 "Every patent for a product or composition of matter must identify it so that
it can be recognized aside from the description of the process for making it, or
else nothing can be held to infringe the patent which is not made by that pro-
cess." Id. at 310.
' See Mirabel, supra note 86, at 36-38 ("an examination of the facts [of BASF]
shows that the statement made by the court made sense in the light of those
facts, but should probably be limited accordingly").
2 The claim specified a dye "produced from anthracine or its derivatives by
either of the methods herein described, or by any other method which will produce
a like result." BASF, 111 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 310. Underlying the Court's holding was its concern that BASFs
method of claiming the dye would grant an overly broad monopoly on a product
which did not exist in a singular form. Id.
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Judge Rader seized upon this part of the holding and con-
strued it as a rule to be applied in questions of infringement
regardless of the factual situation. 26 Judge Rader recognized,
however, that an alternative view of the case could be formu-
lated based on the fact that BASF's original patent did not
pertain to the product because the dye had existed in the prior
art.127 Thus, the most BASF could have asserted was protec-
tion for a new process. Since the defendant used a different
process to manufacture the dye, it could not have infringed on
BASF's patent.
Judge Rader submitted that which view is to be applied
depends upon whether the question at hand is infringement or
patentability. Judge Rader suggested that courts focus on
the process when deciding product-by-process infringement
issues and on the product when deciding product-by-process
patentability issues. 12 These rules do not follow from BASF
and indicate that Judge Rader misinterpreted both "views" of
the case."' The BASF Court, after a long discussion about
whether there had been infringement, merely appreciated that
a much simpler solution existed: if the original patent did not
protect the product, and the process the defendant had used
was different, infringement was not possible.
131
"2 Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 841.
17 BASF, 111 U.S. at 464-65.
128 Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 841. Judge Rader stated:
Thus, in BASF, the Supreme Court addressed both infringement and
validity ... of product claims containing process limitations. In judging
infringement, the Court treated the process terms as limitations on the
patentee's exclusive rights. In assessing validity in terms of patentability,
the Court forbade an applicant from claiming an old product by merely
adding a new process. The infringement rule focused on the process as a




12 See Kenneth R. Adamo, The Double Standard: In re Bond, the Office, 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6 and Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 137 (1992)
("BASF is hardly clear precedent for anything about a proper product-by-process
claim. . . . The court's conclusion that BASF was the proper progenitor of a
product-by-process claim double standard, appears to be bootstrapping").
12 The first step in an infringement suit in any type of patent claim is to
determine the scope of the original patent. If while determining the scope, the
court finds that the product existed in the prior art, the court must limit the
patent scope to the process (provided it is novel). Hence, as Rader would have it,
the focus is on the product. If the product is old, as was the case in BASF, the
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Judge Rader next considered product-by-process claims in
Plummer v. Sargent,132 an infringement case with facts simi-
lar to those in Atlantic. Plummer involved a patent for a pro-
cess that, when applied to iron, caused the iron to mimic the
appearance of bronze.1" The process claimed by Plummer
consisted of covering iron with a very thin coating of linseed
oil, and subjecting it to heat, resulting in the oil becoming
bonded as a varnish on the iron."M Sargent's process differed
slightly from Plummer's: Sargent heated the iron prior to ap-
plying the oil and then heated it to a higher temperature.
3 5
Thus, as in Atlantic, each party performed essentially the same
steps but in a different order.'36 After reviewing the prior art
and the descriptions of both patents, the Court stated:
[It may be assumed that the new article of manufacture... is a
product which results from the use of the process described in the
patent, and not one which may be produced in any other way. So
that, whatever likeness may appear between the product of the
process described in the patent and the article made by the defen-
dants, their identity is not established unless it is shown that they
are made by the same process."
court next determines whether the processes are different. If the processes are
different, there is no infringement. See Mirabel, supra note 86, at 36-38 (exam-
ining what constitutes infringement of a product-by-process claim and concluding
that the accepted rule-product-by-process claims can only be infringed by a pro-
cess-is built on dicta). Had the court found the patent to be valid for the prod-
uct, the focus logically should have been on the product to attempt to discern if
there were differences.
32 120 U.S. 442 (1887).
' Id. at 443. Soon thereafter, Plummer gained additional coverage for the
product made by that process in a reissue. Id. at 445. The claim provided as fol-
lows: "What I claim and desire to secure by letters patent is the new manufacture
hereinabove described, consisting of oil and heat, substantially as described." Id.
A reissue is a method of correcting errors which were made without deceptive
intent that caused a patent to be wholly or partially inoperative or invalid by
reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claim-
ing more or less than he has a right to claim. 35 U.S.C. § 251. See generally 4
CHISUM, supra note 5, § 15.01.
'4 Plummer, 120 U.S. at 444-45.
, Id. at 445.
'6 Atlantic's process involved placing a solid elastomeric material in the heel
section of an innersole and introducing polyurethane foam around it to form the
remainder of the heel. Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 835 (emphasis added). By contrast,
the Sorbathane innersoles, distributed by Faytex, were produced by injecting a
liquid elastomeric material into the innersole mold, and injecting the surrounding
polyurethane while this material was solidifying. Id. at 836.
" Plummer, 120 U.S. at 448.
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The Plummer Court thus held that there was no infringement
as the processes were different.
Judge Rader derived from Plummer the rule that a prod-
uct-by-process claim is not infringed if the defendant's process
differs from the patentee's. 1 Judge Rader, however, ignored
that the Plummer Court explicitly had limited the patentee's
claim because the process patented by Plummer was substan-
tially identical to a prior art process.139 In an attempt to up-
hold a patent which never should have been granted, the Su-
preme Court gave the patent the thinnest of protections, re-
stricting infringement to products made exactly as the paten-
tee described.
The last Supreme Court precedent cited by Judge Rader,
General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp.,4 ' involved a
patent held by GE for a tungsten filament used in incandes-
cent lamps that included product and process claims."' GE
sued Wabash for infringing its patent. In its defense, Wabash
contended that GE's patent was invalid. The Supreme Court
held that GE's patent was invalid on its face because "it
fail[ed] to make a disclosure sufficiently definite to satisfy the
requirements of [35 U.S.C. § 112]. " "' The Court then specu-
lated as to what would occur if a patent such as GE's were
definite enough to satisfy the statutory requirements of disclo-
sure. According to the Court:
Although in some instances a claim may validly describe a new
product with some reference to the method of production, a patentee
who does not distinguish his product from what is old except by ref-
'z' Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 842.
m9 The Plummer Court found:
It seems necessary to follow from this view either that the Tucker pat-
ents are void by reason of the anticipation practiced by [another in the
prior art], or that the patented process and the product must be re-
stricted to exactly what is described .... To that extent the patents may
be sustained, but upon that construction they do not include the process
and product of the defendants; there is consequently no infringement.
Plummer, 120 U.S. at 449. For an analysis of Plummer and related cases, see
Mirabel, supra note 86, at 41.44.
140 304 U.S. 364 (1938).
4 The claim in question in Wabash reads: "A filament for electric incandescent
lamps or other devices, composed substantially of tungsten and made up mainly of
a number of comparatively large grains of such size and contour as to prevent




erence, express or constructive, to the process by which he produced
it, cannot secure a monopoly by whatever means produced.14
The Court then relied upon Cochrane v. BASF to emphasize
that "[elvery patent for a product or composition of matter
must identify it so that it can be recognized aside from the
description of the process for making it, or else nothing can be
held to infringe the patent which is not made by that pro-
cess."'44 Thus, the Court clearly stated that a product-by-pro-
cess claim's scope would not protect the patentee against an-
other making the product by a different method.
In response, Judge Newman noted that while Wabash
provides language helpful to Judge Rader's argument, the case
itself did not involve a product-by-process claim. Rather, it was
concerned with whether the patentee adequately had described
a product in a product claim under the previous patent stat-
ute.145 The Court held the claim invalid on its face because it
failed to make a sufficiently definite statement of the charac-
teristics of the product.'46 Thus, although the Court discussed
product-by-process claims, it did so unnecessarily.47
Judge Newman used the Supreme Court decisions to high-
light her approach to Scripps. She emphasized in her dissent-
ing opinion that "claims are interpreted in accordance with the
nature of the claimed invention, as elucidated by the specifica-
tion, the prior art, and the prosecution history."'48 As she
surveyed the Supreme Court precedent, Judge Newman distin-
guished four of the five Supreme Court cases relied upon by
1 Id. at 373 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 373-74 (quoting Cochrane v. BASF, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884)).
14 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
.. The claim for a tungsten filament described the product as a "filament ...
composed substantially of tungsten and made up mainly of a number of compara-
tively large grains of such size and contour as to prevent substantial sagging and
offsetting during a normal or commercially useful life." Wabash, 304 U.S. at 368.
147 See Mirabel, supra note 86, at 36 ("That the Wabash proposition is dictum is
clear"). Mirabel analyzes the dicta in Wabash, which stated that product-by-process
claims cannot be infringed unless one uses the same process, by examining the
precedent upon which the Wabash Court relied. Mirabel, supra note 86, at 35-43.
He concludes that none of the precedent cited in Wabash supports its broad con-
clusion. iMTirabel, supra note 86, at 40. But see J.S. Saxe & J.S. Levitt, Product-By-
Process Claims and their Current Status in Chemical Patent Office Practice, 42 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 528, 530 (1960) (concluding that "the courts uniformly hold that
only a product produced by the claim-designated process may be held to infringe
[a product-by-process] claim").
"' Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1289.
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Judge Rader by noting that the patentee in each of those cases
had attempted to use a product-by-process claim to patent an
old product."' Therefore, regardless of the method used to
patent those products, the maximum patent protection avail-
able to the patentee was the scope argued by Judge
Rader-protection of the process and the product made from
that process. The fifth case, BASF, had not involved a product-
by-process patent, and thus any references to product-by-pro-
cess patents were dicta.
The Supreme Court precedent gathered by Judge Rader
does not support the proposition that the Court intended to
limit a product-by-process claim's scope to the process and the
product made by that process. Instead, as Judge Newman
states, the Atlantic decision is "a collection of dicta lifted out of
context, until a new structure has been built on the most tenu-
ous of supports."5 ' Because Atlantic rests on such tenuous
reasoning, it is important to explore the underlying principals
and policies that courts are likely to evaluate when faced with
a Scripps-like case in the future.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although lower courts often find it comforting to rest their
decisions on "binding" precedent, seldom does precedent alone
decide a case. Courts generally weigh prior precedent against
public policy considerations. 5' Cases such as Scripps and At-
lantic implicate many such concerns. For example, certainty to
third parties concerning the scope of claimed inventions is
important for people wishing to avoid infringement. Further-
more, bright-line rules for product-by-process claims facilitate
courts' decisions in this area. Finally, certainty in the law
must be balanced with the need to provide incentives for in-
ventors to disclose information and the inequity of limiting
claims that satisfy statutory requirements.
1 Id. at 1289-92.
1 O Id. at 1297. See Michael J. Schutte, Note, Controversy in the Federal Circuit
Over Product-By-Process Claims, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 283, 307 (1993) (MThe
precedent relied upon by the Atlantic majority does not stand for a singular rule
that applies to all product-by-process claims.").
"' Both Judge Newman and Judge Rader acknowledged the importance of poli-
cy in their opinions. See Atlantic, 974 F.2d at 1282, 1303.
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A. Third Party Certainty
The foremost concern of the patent system is to clearly
define the scope of patents so that people may avoid actions
that infringe. Judge Rader argues that, because a product-by-
process claim refers only to the process, it necessarily creates a
greater chance of others infringing it. Admittedly, a product-
by-process claim burdens the public with determining what the
product of the process is. If another person arrives at the prod-
uct by a different process, that person may not realize that the
products are substantially similar.
This problem is not unique to product-by-process claims,
however; it occurs in conventional product patents as well.'52
Manufacturers often are unsure as to whether a proposed
product will infringe a patented product. As a result, clients
seek the advice of attorneys, and at times court proceedings
are the only method of determining infringement. All patent
claims contain a degree of uncertainty. The uncertainty caused
by product-by-process claims does not merit holding an inven-
tor to a higher standard of definition.
Furthermore, courts and the PTO have created mecha-
nisms for alleviating some of this uncertainty. As part of its
initial review during patent prosecution, the PTO insures that
every patent issued satisfies the statutory requirements and
that the claim adequately describes the invention.5 ' More-
over, the Federal Circuit, by ruling that claim construction is a
question of law,' has provided an additional check on the
PTO's determination by conducting a de novo review during
12 In fact, individuals attempting to invent around an existing patent of any
type "not only must deal with the precise language of existing patent claims, but
also must evaluate the penumbra created by the possibility of equitable infringe-
ment." Wegner, supra note 104, at 30. Thus, the uncertainty produced by product-
by-process claims is not unique. It exists in all patents to some degree.
1 The test for adequacy is whether one of ordinary skill in the art would
understand, in light of the specification, what the inventor claims. 35 U.S.C. §
103; Ryko Mfg. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Orthokinetics,
Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, 806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Rosemount, Inc. v.
Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Wertheim, 541
F.2d 257 (C.C.PA. 1976). See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text for a re-
view of how a patent is obtained.
"" Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1540 (1994); Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., 888
F.2d 815, 818 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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infringement proceedings. This extra audit makes it even less
likely that an unclear claim will confuse the true limits of the
patent.
Judge Rader exaggerated the danger presented by unclear
product-by-process patent claims. He bases his explanation of
why the PTO focused on the product (rather than the process)
during a determination of patentability on what he viewed as
the difficulty with providing a third party with sufficient no-
tice. Judge Rader recognized that during the examination of a
patent's validity ambiguous products present PTO examiners
with the same problems faced by third parties. The increased
numbers of product-by-process claims place an enormous ad-
ministrative burden on the PTO, who often "lack facilities to
replicate processes and compare the resultant product with
prior art."155 This difficulty, in Judge Rader's view, leads the
PTO to assess patentability by concentrating on the product
rather than the process, thereby preventing an applicant from
"obtaining exclusive rights to an old product by merely claim-
ing a new process.""' 6
This proposition is the primary weakness of Judge Rader's
argument. Because he could not deny that the PTO, with the
CCPA's blessing, always has examined the product in a prod-
uct-by-process claim for the requisite showing of novelty, use-
fulness and nonobviousness, Judge Rader rationalized the
procedure by arguing that the PTO examines the product to
prevent the patentee from obtaining rights to an old product.
According to Judge Rader, the only benefits gained by the
patentee from a product-by-process claim are the "protections
against infringement 'if the machine or process was used in
another country and the product imported."' 57 Thus, Judge
Rader asserted that the PTO begins examining the product of
product-by-process claims only after it has perceived that a
patentee could misappropriate an old product.
When the PTO begins to scrutinize the product during
' Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 844; see also In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535 (C.C.PA.
1972) (the PTO is not equipped to manufacture products by the myriad of process-
es put before it and then obtain prior art products and make physical compari-
sons).
1 Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 844-45.
'57 Id. at 844 (quoting Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., 77 F.2d 274, 279 (2d
Cir. 1935) (Hand, J.)).
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product-by-process claim prosecutions, however, this added
protection against foreign importation of infringing products is
not considered an issue. Indeed, Judge Learned Hand foresaw
the protection as potentially beneficial, but was not sure that
the PTO granted patents in such a form. 5 ' In Buono v. Yan-
kee Maid Dress Corp., which involved an infringement suit for
a type of blind stitch produced by a sewing machine, Judge
Hand held that because the patent was for a product and "not
for the product of a machine,"'59 the product must be of the
requisite novelty. Judge Hand found that the stitch claimed
was not new, and concluded that the patent was invalid and
therefore could not be infringed.' During the explanation of
his findings, Judge Hand considered limiting a product-by-
process patent-as Judge Rader later would suggest-but
found that
[alt any rate a product patent not so limited.., must be new as
such, that is, regardless of the process or machine which makes it;
and it must stand upon its own invention, again independently of
the machine or process which makes it.'
Thus, Judge Hand examined the product of the product-by-
process claim because that is what the patentee had claimed. A
patentee would not endure the burden of proving that the
product satisfied the requirements of the patent law if there
was no benefit to doing so. As the court did in Buono, the PTO
similarly focuses on the product not to prevent claims for old
products but because the applicant has sought protection for
the product regardless of the process.
In fairness to Judge Rader, however, a patentee's desire to
claim the product using a product-by-process claim does not
eliminate the PTO's problem of ensuring that the product is
new in comparison with the prior art. The Federal Circuit
developed an administrative technique to address this problem
because the PTO cannot be expected to manufacture and com-
pare products in the patent application process with products
15' "[1It is hard to find instances [of product-by-process patents only infringed by
the product of a machine or of a process], probably because the Patent Office does






in the prior art. The PTO need only establish a prima facie
showing that a product is obvious in view of the prior art. A
prima facie case of obviousness is established when the teach-
ings from the prior art itself suggest the claimed subject mat-
ter to a person of ordinary skill in the art.162 At that point
the burden of proof shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima
facie case by presenting evidence that the prior art does not
anticipate the claimed invention.63
1" See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that examiner did not
establish prima facie case of obviousness in claim for an amino acid sequence
where the gene and its encoded protein were in the prior art); In re Thorpe, 777
F.2d 695, 697-98 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (after the examiner noted the similarities be-
tween the product in the prior art and the applicant's product, the burden shifted
to the applicant "to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inher-
ently possess the characteristics of his claimed product"); In re Marosi, 710 F.2d
799 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (court upheld rejection of product-by-process claims because
appellants had not produced evidence which showed the unobvious difference be-
tween the claimed product and the prior art); In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742
(C.C.P.A. 1974). In Fessmann, the court described the procedure first articulated in
In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1972), to support its reasoning:
[Tmhe lack of physical description in a product-by-process claim makes de-
termination of the patentability of the claim more difficult, since in spite
of the fact that the claim may recite only process limitations, it is the
patentability of the product claimed and not of the recited process steps
which must be established. We are therefore of the opinion that when
the prior art discloses a product which reasonably appears to be either
identical with or only slightly different than a product claimed in a prod-
uct-by-process claim, a rejection based alternatively on either section 102
or section 103 of the statute is eminently fair and acceptable.
Fessmann, 489 F.2d at 744 (quoting Brown, 459 F.2d at 535). The court found
that the applicant did not meet his burden for patentability because he failed to
show that his product possessed unobvious differences from the prior art. See also
Mirabel, supra note 86, at 16 ("The practical effect of [Brown] is that if the
claimed product and the prior art product appear similar following a perusal of
the application and the prior art, a prima facie case is established and the claim
will be rejected.").
"n In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216
(Fed. Cir. 1988). Dillon provides an example of how this procedural tool works in
practice. In Dillon, the applicant claimed hydrocarbon fuel/tetra-orthoester composi-
tions and related methods of use, which exhibited the unexpected property of re-
ducing particulate emissions during combustion. The PTO rejected the claim for
obviousness because prior art references disclosed that: 1) hydrocarbon fuel/tri-
orthoester compositions also reduced particulate emissions; and 2) tri- and tetra-
orthoesters reacted similarly under related conditions. The PTO found that the
prior art supported prima facie obviousness and that the applicant failed to pro-
vide evidence rebutting obviousness, such as evidence that showed some unexpect-
ed superiority of the claimed tetra-orthoester compositions in comparison.with the
tri-orthoester compositions.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO decision, finding that
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Atlantic provides an example of this procedure's useful-
ness. Faytex distributed innersoles that were produced by a
process with steps different from Atlantic's process.' In an
infringement case, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in
the district court's holding that the processes were substan-
tially different.165 Had Faytex claimed its innersole product
in the form of a product-by-process claim after the Atlantic
innersole already had been manufactured (before the PTO
could grant a patent), the examiner would have been required
to determine whether Faytex's innersole was nonobvious. The
PTO would have been confronted with seemingly identical
products with no way of discerning their differences.
The PTO would have to establish only a prima facie case
of obviousness and could do so simply by pointing out the simi-
larities between the two products to shift the burden to Faytex.
Faytex would carry the heavy burden of showing that the dif-
ferent process created a substantially different product. Thus,
the PTO is not required to manufacture a product in order to
make comparisons for questions of patentability, but need es-
tablish only some similarity between the claimed and prior art
subject matter. The PTO accomplishes this by combining refer-
ences where the prior art gives reason or motivation to make
the claimed compositions.'66 The PTO's application proce-
dures, thus, already deter patent applicants from attempting to
patent old products by using a product-by-process claim.
Despite these protections, application of Judge Rader's
rule remains significant in patent validity proceedings. When
structural similarity between claimed and prior art subject matter, proved
by combining references or otherwise, where the prior art gives reason or
motivation to make the claimed compositions, creates a prima facie case
of obviousness, and that the burden (and opportunity) then falls on an
applicant to rebut that prima facie case. Such rebuttal or argument can
consist of a comparison of test data showing that the claimed composi-
tions possess unexpectedly improved properties or properties that the
prior art does not have ....
919 F.2d at 692-93. Thus, the PTO's burden of comparison is diminished by this
procedural tool. If faced with a product-by-process claim that may be taught by
the prior art, the PTO need only point to the similarities between the claimed
composition and the prior art and wait for the applicant to rebut the prima facie
showing.
... Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 836.
, Id. at 834, 837-38.
1c6 Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692-93.
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confronted with an infringement action a court first must in-
terpret the allegedly infringed patent claims. The court also
must classify the claim as either a product claim, a process
claim or a product-by-process claim. This classification will
determine the scope of the protection granted to the patentee.
A patentee with a product claim may exclude others from mak-
ing, using or selling the patented product. If, however, the
court construes the patentee's claim as a product-by-process
claim, according to the rule in Atlantic, the scope of the patent
is relatively limited. A product-by-process claim would only
grant a monopoly on the process and the product made from
that specific process."s In many cases, therefore, the initial
classification of the claim determines whether a defendant has
infringed.
The Atlantic panel's decision to limit the scope of product-
by-process claims to the process and the product made by the
process offers a clear-cut rule that courts may follow easily. In
practice, however, it is difficult to distinguish a product-by-
process claim from product claims with structural6 ' or pro-
cess limitations."9 One commentator, who reviewed CCPA
decisions that questioned the classification of a claim as either
a product claim or a product-by-process claim, concluded:
[T]here are hazy lines separating "true" product claims from product
claims which include a process limitation from "true" product-by-
process claims. The determination seems to focus on the degree of
specificity with which the product is defined in the absence of the
process limitations. The more precise that definition, the greater the
chance that the claim will be considered a "true" product claim. As
the structural definition disappears there is a shift towards "product
claims with a process limitation" and ultimately to the product-by-
Atlantic, 970 F.2d at 847.
Consider, for example, the claim in In re Steppan, 394 F.2d 1013 (C.C.PA.
1967). The claim read as follows: "An acid phosphate of a condensation product
selected from the group consisting of [named acid phosphates] ... the acid phos-
phate having the general formula ArN2HI2PO4H3PO4, in which ArN2 is ... con-
densed with formaldehyde." Id. at 1019. One could argue that as the product itself
is not described specifically, but instead is referred to as a "condensation product"
or "condensed with formaldehyde," the claim describes a product in terms of the
process which it must undergo, and as such is a product-by-process claim. The
court, however, found that it was a product claim with structural limitations. Id.
'1 See Mirabel, supra note 86, at 3-11 (the difference between product-by-pro-
cess claims and product claims with process limitations is extremely subtle). A
process limitation describes the manner in which the product is made. Id. at 4.
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process end of the spectrum. 7 '
Ultimately, the degree of structural specificity in the claim
will be used to define the breadth of a monopoly (regardless of
whether the product otherwise satisfies the statutory require-
ments) because the line between product-by-process claims and
product claims with process limitations is too "hazy" to be de-
terminative.'' In the final analysis, the court will decide,
based on a subjective finding, whether the claim satisfies the
degree of specificity required to attain product status. A claim
that fails this test will be relegated to a product-by-process
claim and the scope of protection granted will be reduced sig-
nificantly.
B. The Patent Compact: Protection for Disclosure
Courts determining patent validity also will be concerned
about maintaining an incentive to pursue new inventions. The
most significant right a patent grants is that of exclusivity: the
right to prevent others from making, using or selling the
patentee's invention.7" In exchange for this grant of monopo-
ly, the inventor must disclose his or her invention in enough
detail to enable one skilled in the art to reproduce the inven-
tion without undue experimentation." Generally, the level of
disclosure determines the extent of the patent monopoly. Dis-
closure theory is based on the rationale that without patent
protection inventors would conceal their inventions to prevent
exploitation by others.' In exchange for the gains in effi-
170 Mirabel, supra note 86, at 10.
171 As a consequence of the Atlantic decision, rarely will an inventor claim his
invention as a product-by-process claim. More likely, the inventor will use product-
by-process claims as a hedge against the court invalidating a product claim. See
MPEP, supra note 41, at § 706.03(e). The Manual of Patent Exardning Procedure
follows the decision in In re Hughes in allowing the product to be patented by
reference to the process:
Where an applicant's product in [sic] incapable of description by product
claims which are of different scope, he is entitled to product-by-process
claims that recite his novel process of manufacture as a hedge against
the possibility that his broader product claims may be invalidated. In re
Hughes, 182 U.S!P.Q. (BNA) 106 (C.CP.A. 1974).
Id.
172 35 U.S.C. § 154.
173 Id. § 112.
174 Ko, supra note 14, at 795-96; Greenfield, supra note 13, at 1059.
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ciency by the scientific community and the resulting benefits to
society, the government uses its court system to enforce a
patentee's monopoly.
Product-by-process claims, however, do not fit this theory
as easily as conventional product claims. A standard product
patent discloses the structure of the product, leaving little
mystery as to its identity. Science builds upon the disclosed
information to increase the existing level of knowledge. One
commentator describes this tradeoff in patent law as "fully
satisfied only when the scope of the patent grant is commensu-
rate with the discovery, and not so broad as to stifle further
advances in the state of the art."' Because a product-by-pro-
cess claim only discloses the process for producing the product,
science does not obtain the amount of knowledge normally
gained through a product patent.
Product-by-process claims often benefit society in other
potentially more meaningful ways, however. As discussed earli-
er, inventors frequently are driven to use product-by-process
claims out of necessity when they lack the requisite knowledge
to establish the level of disclosure a conventional product claim
requires. The disclosure of the process is itself a great benefit
to society.176 For example, the method used to purify human
insulin in the Scripps claim enabled subsequent researchers to
develop a more cost-effective method of producing insulin.'77
Granting diminished patent rights for product-by-process
claims not only discourages the release of a means of produc-
ing important medical compounds, but also discourages invest-
ment in these areas of study.7'
The patent system was created to encourage innovation in
science and the useful arts. Inventors who must use a product-
by-process claim to patent their inventions are dedicated to a
science that often cannot be described by existing language.
Providing broader "conventional" product protection to product-
by-process patents does not encourage fraud. On the contrary,
this type of claim dissuades such behavior because it is diffi-
SWegner, supra note 104, at 31.
" See McGough & Burke, supra note 16, at 101 ("Public policy is advanced by
broad biotechnology patent prosecutions . . ").
77 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
17" See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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cult to prove that a particular product is the patented one. For
those who have enough information about the structure of the
product they wish to patent, it would be unwise to attempt to
patent using a product-by-process claim as there is no guaran-
tee that it will succeed. Nor is there a guarantee as to which
approach a reviewing court will take.
Atlantic presents two opposing approaches to dealing with
product-by-process claims. Judge Rader would limit the scope
of a product-by-process claim to protect both the process and
the product made by that process. Judge Newman would not
limit the scope but instead would reinstate the showing of
necessity prior to allowing an applicant to use a product-by-
process claim. Both approaches in effect limit an inventor's
options when confronting stringent patent application re-
quirements.
Courts should not require a showing of necessity in prod-
uct-by-process claims but instead should afford the two claims
equally broad scopes. Judge Newman disagreed with the Atlan-
tic's definition of the scope of product-by-process claims, yet
would restrict the use of product-by-process claims as well. For
example, Judge Newman advocated returning to the necessity
rule first defined in Ex parte Painter,"' because she viewed it
as a "practical solution to an important problem."'' 0 In other
words, Judge Newman's opinion suggests that the necessity
rule is an outgrowth of the application process, which requires
that the claim be definite and the specification reveal the "best
mode" '' of carrying out the claimed invention.
182
Federal Circuit precedent supports the Painter rule when
one considers that the Federal Circuit never has explicitly
overruled the necessity requirement." Yet strong policy rea-
" 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 200; see supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
... Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
... The best-mode requirement's purpose is to prevent an inventor from disclos-
ing the invention while withholding from the public the preferred embodiments of
the invention. See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 7.05.
182 35 U.S.C. § 112.
z" The court in In re Hughes went the farthest toward stating this proposition
when it held that product-by-process claims can be made along with "conventional"
product claims as a hedge against the narrower product claims' invalidation. 496
F.2d 1216, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1974). See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
The patent statutes, however, do not require an inventor to claim an inven-
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sons support allowing the patentee to determine which method
to use when drafting a patent claim. An inventor applying for
a patent confronts an enormous task of describing the inven-
tion so that it establishes the requisite novelty, usefulness and
nonobviousness, while also being definite. Inventors frequently
disagree over the best approach to patenting the invention.
(While the PTO rules on whether the claim is valid, it does not
inform the inventor how to patent an invention.) Occasionally,
the inventor decides that she cannot define a product by its
structure, and instead opts for a product-by-process claim. One
court recognized the importance of giving the inventor the
choice of how to define her own invention:
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a
series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought
written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of
machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be
satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not
exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of
the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words,
but words for things. To overcome this lag, patent law allows the
inventor to be his own lexicographer.'"
To grant the inventor the freedom to formulate his patent
claim, the necessity rule should not be reinstituted. The rule
would force the inventor to claim in a conventional form if the
PTO examiner determines that a necessity to claim by a prod-
uct-by-process does not exist.
Finally, the patent application process contains enough
hurdles to expose any fraudulent inventor who attempts to
gain the wider scope available through a product-by-process
claim that ultimately is treated as a conventional product
claim. The burden of proving a product patent valid while only
referring to the process is significant." Among the hurdles
tion by any particular method. Even more telling is the fact that the Painter ne-
cessity rule was not grounded in any statute, nor did it state any solid policy
reason for its conclusion. The Federal Circuit should not rest its decisions on pre-
cedent that has been clearly undermined over the years, see supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text, and that is not supported by convincing argument.
... Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
"' As one commentator stated, the product-by-process claim "is disadvantageous
in many respects.... Given [product-by-process claim's] other disadvantages ...
one would rarely want to use this format absent 'necessity.'" Mirabel, supra note
86, at 3, 15.
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an inventor faces is the standard of definiteness and the prima
facie standard, either of which the PTO may use to force the
patentee to prove that the product is nonobvious.'86
Judge Learned Hand recognized the difficulty of satisfying
the requirements of patent prosecution in Buono v. Yankee
Maid Dress Corp. Judge Hand suggested that since a product-
by-process claim is based on the product, the scope of the pat-
ent should protect the product regardless of how it was made:
It would seem to follow that the invention in the case of such a
product patent [gained by product-by-process claim] must lie exclu-
sively in the conception of the product, and regardless of any method
of its production, though of course the patent must disclose one way
by which it can be made. While that imposes a severe standard, it is
no severer than it should be, if the monopoly is to extend to the
product however made."U
Thus, Judge Hand recognized that a new product could be
claimed by a process so long as the product fulfills the statuto-
ry requirements. He based his conclusion on the "severe stan-
dard" demanded by the patent application process. If the in-
vention attempted to be patented by a process proved not to be
innovative, then the product-by-process claim would fail, and
the inventor would gain a patent on a "product produced by
other machines and processes, to which by hypothesis he has
contributed nothing."'"
Limiting a product-by-process claim's scope to only the
process and the product made by the process is inequitable if
the patent already has survived the PTO's heightened scrutiny.
An inventor who has patented a product with a product-by-
process claim has satisfied the more difficult task of convincing
a PTO examiner that the product is novel, useful and non-
obvious while only referring to the process used to make the
product."9 This accomplishment merits the monopoly granted
by a product patent.
During an infringement proceeding the court should focus
184 See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
... Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., 77 F.2d 274, 279 (2d Cir. 1935).
1 Id.
As noted earlier, the PTO has a lesser burden of proof to establish obvious-
ness during a patentability proceeding because the PTO cannot be expected to
manufacture allegedly patentable products and compare them to the prior art.
SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States ITC, 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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on the patentee's burden of proving beyond a preponderance of
evidence that the opposite party infringed the patented prod-
uct, rather than on whether the claim is a product-by-process
claim or a product claim. If the party who claimed the product
in a product-by-process claim is unable to show that "more
likely than not" the accused product infringes upon the patent,
then the infringement suit fails. Thus, the burden of proof
serves as a last check on the definiteness of the claim: the
more unclear the definition of the product is, the less likely the
court will find infringement.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created
to promote stability in the nation's patent laws. In addition,
Congress devised the Federal Circuit in recognition of the fact
that investors need a level of security in the law to enable
sound economic decisions. To this end, the Federal Circuit
developed operating procedures to permit the law to develop in
a principled fashion. A majority in the Federal Circuit seems to
have lost sight of that purpose while considering Atlantic v.
Faytex. Rather than debating an important issue en bane, they
chose to ignore past precedent and instead, building on Su-
preme Court dicta, drastically altered the level of protection
granted to product-by-process claims.
A close examination of the result of this decision reveals
that applicants who use a product-by-process claim to patent a
product are burdened with the same requirements as those
who patent using a conventional product claim. As such, they
should be entitled to the same protection as conventional prod-
uct claims. Additionally, over the years the Patent Office ap-
propriately has developed a liberal attitude towards allowing
an inventor to choose how he or she wishes to claim an inven-
tion. Requiring a showing of necessity denies this choice and
mistakenly empowers the patent examiner to make decisions
which may affect the scope of the patent.
Product-by-process claims fill an important gap in patent
law by furnishing an inventor who cannot describe her inven-
tion in terms precise enough to gain a conventional product
patent with the means to gain the same protection. This type
of claim must be preserved so that inventors who push the
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envelope scientifically are encouraged to disclose inventions
that push the envelope linguistically.
Brian S. Tomko

